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JURISDICTION 
This is a response to the Petitioner Arco Electric's 
("Petitioner") Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals filed on July 
7, 1997. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to the transfer provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-2 (4) (Supp. 1996) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the Commission gave a sufficient notice of the 
status conference to Petitioner when it mailed a Certificate of 
Service to Petitioner's legal counsel (the "counsel") and to 
Petitioner's last known legal address? 
II. Whether the Utah State Tax Commission (the 
"Commission") abused its discretion when it did not grant a 
relief from its Order of Default and dismissed Petitioner's 
Petition for Redetermination (the "Petition")? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under the Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-5.B.2 (1996), if the 
Commission has not specified proceedings as informal, xx [a] 11 
other adjudicative proceedings will be formal adjudicative 
1 
proceedings." In this case, a status conference was part of a 
formal adjudicative proceeding. In accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a)(b), this Court should use the following 
standard of review for the decision reached at the status 
conference: 
(1) [w]hen reviewing formal adjudicative 
proceedings commenced before the commission, the Court 
of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its 
written findings of fact, applying a substantial 
evidence standard of review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning 
conclusions of law, applying a correction of error 
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in the statute at issue before the 
appellate court. 
Moreover, section 59-1-610(2) of the Utah Tax Code 
supersedes section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Admin. Code, providing 
guidelines for judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings, including abuse of discretion review. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-610(2) (Supp. 1996). Also, courts have held that an 
"agenc[y's] findings of fact [should be] granted considerable 
deference and would not be disturbed on appeal if supported by 
substantial evidence." Morton Int., Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the 
2 
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991)(holding that 
materials used in construction did not qualify for exemption from 
sales and use tax.) On the contrary, under the correction-of-
error standard, the court should give no deference to an agency's 
decisions. Id. at 584. 
The courts gave one exception to the correction-of-error 
standard. An administrative agency's decision should be given 
great weight in the agency's area of expertise so long as no 
clear misinterpretation of statutes or rules is evident. Boyd v. 
Dep't of Employment Sec. 773 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that participants in a retirement program had good cause 
to reject job referrals). Thus, when the agency is acting within 
its area of expertise, the courts should apply "an intermediate 
standard" to review its decisions. Morton, at 585. Under the 
intermediate standard, "appellate courts [do] not disturb an 
agency's decision if the decision [is] within the bounds of 
reasonableness." Id. at 585. Thus, because Petitioner's tax 
liability is an area of special expertise of the Commission, the 
court should apply a deferential standard when reviewing the 
3 
factual findings of the Commission as stated in the Order of 
Default. 
Moreover, when the Commission entered a default judgment and 
denied the Petition for Reconsideration, it made a conclusion of 
law. This conclusion was within the discretion of the 
Commission. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-ll(l) (1993) (stating 
that w[t]he presiding officer may enter an order of default 
judgement against a party . . . ") and Administrative Rule R861-
1A-5.P. (stating that [t]he Commission has wide discretion in 
accepting or rejecting [petitions for reconsideration]. Thus, 
the court should review the Commission's decision to enter a 
default judgment against Petitioner and its final order 
dismissing the Petition under the deferential standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-ll(l) (1993): 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default 
against a party if: 
(a) a party in a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to participate in the adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled 
hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative 
4 
proceeding fails to file a response under Section 63-
46b-6. 
Utah Admin. Code R861-1-5(B)(l)and(2)(1996): 
(1) Informal adjudicative proceedings. The following 
shall be informal adjudicative proceedings: 
(a) appeals requesting the waiver of penalty and 
interest where the amount in controversy is $250.00 or 
less; 
(b) all proceedings to revoke, suspend, or refuse to 
renew any license or permit related to motor vehicles; 
and 
(c) any hearing designated as an informal proceeding 
by the Commission. 
(2) Formal adjudicative proceedings. Excepting the 
proceedings which are specifically informal 
proceedings, all other adjudicative proceedings will be 
formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-5(G)(1)(1996): 
G. Default 
1. The presiding officer may enter an order of default 
against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to participate in the adjudicative proceedings; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails 
to attend or participate in a hearing; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to file a response within the time specified. 
Default, however, shall not be entered against the 
Commission or any division without a prior hearing on 
whether a default should be entered. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e)(1)(5): 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made 
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as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual . . . by delivering copy 
of the summons and/or complaint to an agent authorized 
by appointment or by law to receive service of process; 
(5) Upon any corporation . . . by delivering a 
copy thereof to an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by 
law to receive service . . . . 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5(b)(1): 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) Whenever . . . service is required or 
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an 
attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney 
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the 
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall 
be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to 
him at his known address . . . 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b): 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion . . . the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a response to Petitioner's appeal from the final 
order of the Commission. The Commission affirmed a default 
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judgment against Petitioner for failing to appear at the status 
conference on October 9, 1996 regarding Appeal No. 93-0237 and 
affirmed a dismissal of the Petitioner's Petition for 
Reconsideration. (R. 5, 20.) The final order was entered by the 
Commission on March 7, 1997. (R. 5-6). The case has been 
assigned to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Petitioner claims that it did not received a notice of a 
status conference (the "Notice") and that it was sent to an 
improper address. (Petitioner's Brief at 12-13.) Petitioner 
also claims that the Notice was improperly mailed to the 
Petitioner's attorney. (Petitioner's Brief at 14.) Also, 
Petitioner claims that the Commission abused its discretion when 
it entered its default judgment, and that it violated 
Petitioner's due process rights to be heard. (Petitioner's Brief 
at 15-17.) 
STATEMENT 0? THE FACTS 
1. A Petition for Redetermination (Addenda A) was filed by 
Petitioner in the Appeals Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission on January 19, 1993. (R. 39.) 
7 
case. (R. 26.) The Certificate of Service states that the 
request was mailed to Shawn D. Turner at Larson, Kirkham & 
Turner, L.C. at 4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 Salt Lake City, UT 
84107. This address is identical to Mr. Turner's Notice of 
Substitution of Counsel. (R. 27.) 
8. The Appeals division mailed a Notice of Status 
Conference (the "Notice") (Addenda C) on August 6, 1996. (R. 
23.) The Certificate of Mailing states that the Notice was sent 
to Petitioner (at the address in the heading on the initial 
pleading) and Petitioner's counsel at the same address as on Mr. 
Turner's Substitution of Counsel, also on August 6, 1996. (R. 
25.) 
9. When Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel failed to 
appear at the conference, the Commission entered an Order of 
Default (Addenda D) on November 27, 1996, (R. 20-21.) 
10. On December 16, 1996, Petitioner sent a Request for 
Reconsideration. (R. 10.) 
11. The Commission issued an Order denying the Petition 
(Addenda E) on March 7, 1997. (R. 4-7.) 
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12. Petitioner timely appealed the Order of Default to the 
Utah Supreme Court on April 7, 1997 in its Petition for Review of 
the Order. (R. 2.) However, no docketing statement pursuant to 
Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure was filed by 
Petitioner. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission properly dismissed the Petition since under 
Utah law a notice is properly sent when it has been sent either 
to the party or to the party's agent or counsel. Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-ll(1), the officer presiding at the proceedings, 
may enter a default judgment if a party failed to appear after 
"receiving proper notice." Under Rule 4(e)(5) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure ("Utah R. Civ. P."), personal service on a 
corporation could be made by "delivering a copy thereof to an 
officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized 
by appointment or by law to receive service of process and . . . 
by also mailing a copy to defendant." Under Rule 5(b) of the 
Utah R. Civ. P., service is permitted to be made with a party 
represented by an attorney, allowing that, "Service by mail is 
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complete upon mailing." The same rule has been adopted in at 
least two other sections of the code. Because the Notice was 
mailed to counsel at his correct address, service was complete. 
The following failure of counsel to appear at the status 
conference was sufficient cause for dismissal. 
Petitioner also claims that the Commission abused its 
discretion when it denied the Petition for Reconsideration. The 
Commission did not err, nor abuse its discretion by denying 
Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration. First, a status 
conference is part of a formal adjudicatory proceeding initiated 
in 1993. At no time did the Appeals Division designate the 
proceeding as informal. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Admin. Code 
R861-1A-5B.2, this was a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
The Commission has not abused its discretion, has not acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously, and has not acted unconstitutionally 
in dismissing the Petition. Pursuant to the discretion granted 
to the Utah State Tax Commission by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-ll, 
and Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-5B.2, and in the Notice of Status 
Conference itself, any pretrial conference (including a status 
11 
conference) is a "hearing" for which failure to attend may 
justify default. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MAILING OF THE NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER'S LAST 
KNOWN ADDRESS AND TO THE PETITIONER'S COUNSEL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO PROPERLY NOTIFY PETITIONER OF THE 
STATUS CONFERENCE. 
When the Commission mailed the Notice to the Petitioner's 
last known address and to the Petitioner's counsel, the 
Commission fulfilled requirements of proper notification. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-ll(l) (1993) states: 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default 
against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to participate in the adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled 
hearing after receiving proper notice; ... 
The U.S. Supreme Court previously held that notice should comply 
with the requirements of "practicability" and must "be reasonably 
calculated to reach interested parties." Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306, 318 1950) (holding that 
notice by publication was not sufficient with respect to known 
present beneficiaries of the trust fund). Here, the Petitioner 
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initiated the action, listed the address of counsel and 
Petitioner in the initial pleading (R. 39), and has the 
responsibility then and thereafter of keeping the Appeals 
Division advised of any changes. 
A. The UAPA Pees Not Imply That an Administrative 
Agency Should Verify Receipt of a Notice of 
Hearing. 
The Commission mailed the Notice to the Petitioner's counsel 
at the address listed on his Notice of Substitution of Counsel. 
(R. 28.) Moreover, the Commission had been sending 
correspondence only to the Petitioner's counsel since 1993, the 
accepted practice between Petitioner and the Commission for the 
duration of this case. From its initial pleading, the Petitioner 
had only supplied counsel's address as that of the Petitioner, 
listing it twice on the face of the Petition for Redetermination. 
(R. 39.) The Petitioner has the burden of notifying the 
adjudicator of changes of address, and indeed, counsel did so. 
The Notice was sent to that very address as evidenced by the 
mailing certificate. (R. 22.) When the Commission mailed the 
Notice to the counsel's address, it complied with the "reasonably 
13 
calculated" standard adopted in Mullane. Thus, Petitioner was 
properly notified of the upcoming proceedings. 
B. Accordjng to Utah Common Law, the Commission 
Properly Sent a Notice to Petitioner's Last Known 
Address and to its Counsel. 
Utah courts upheld the principle of reasonabless in 
determining whether a person has been properly served. They held 
that service of process to the last known address or to a party's 
attorney is sufficient. See Sperry v. Smith. 694 P.2d 581, 582 
(Utah 1984) (holding that defendant's attorney substantially 
complied with the rule regarding withdrawal of the counsel when 
he mailed a copy to plaintiff's attorney). In Sperry. the 
defendant's attorney filed with the trial court a written notice 
of withdrawal. On the notice, he certified that he had mailed a 
copy of the notice to the plaintiff's attorney. The court held 
that Mi]n so doing, he complied with Rule 5(b)(1), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure." Id. at 582. It held that w[t]hat rule provides 
for service of notices on opposing counsel by mail, and service 
14 
is complete upon mailing." (Emphasis added.)1 
As in Sperry, the Commission here complied with Utah R. Civ. 
P.# Rules 4(e)(1)(5) and Rule 5(b)(1), and mailed a copy of the 
Notice to Petitioner's last known address and to Petitioner's 
counsel. Petitioner's last address and his attorney's address 
were the two addresses that the Commission had used for prior 
notices. (R. 7, 17, 22, 25, 32, 34, and 38.) The Commission is 
not required to verify that Petitioner or his attorney had 
actually received the Notice. See argument supra. The 
Commission complied with statutory requirements of proper notice 
and reasonabless standard adopted in Mullane. Therefore, this 
1
 See also In Re Schwenke. 865 P.2d 1350, 1354 (Utah 
1993)(holding that even under the stringent requirements of Utah 
R. Civ. P., Rule 4, "it is not required to that a plaintiff 
exhaust all possibilities as a .means of finding and serving a 
defendant, only that the plaintiff exercise[d] reasonable 
diligence in good faith."); Carlson v. Bos. 740 P.2d 1269, 1277 
(Utah 1987) (upholding Mullane's requirements of the "reasonably 
calculated" notice); In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 
991, 994 (Utah 1982) (holding that attorneys are agents of their 
clients); Remington-Rand v. O'Neil. 4 Utah 2d 270, 272, 239 P.2d 
416, 417 (Utah 1956) (holding that service could be made "by 
handing or mailing a copy to the attorney of record or the party" 
and that proof of such service could be made by an affidavit of 
person making the service or by testimony of that person.) 
15 
court should recognize that mailing of the Notice to the last 
known address and to Petitioner's counsel was a proper 
notification. 
C. Reasonable Statutory Interpretation Justifies The 
Commission's Orders-
Petitioner erroneously claims that under the plain language 
rule of the statutory construction the legislature required that 
the notice should be both send and received by the party. 
(Petitioner's Brief at 13.) First, UAPA should be construed as a 
whole. Sutherland Stat. Constr. § 46.05 (5th Ed.). * [W]hen 
interpreting a statute all parts must be construed together 
without according undue importance to a single or isolated 
portion." Xd. Second, there are some limits on the literalism. 
" [A] court must look beyond the language of a statute to arrive 
at the legislative purpose" and should not read the statute 
literally when usuch a reading is contrary to its purposes." Id. 
at §46.07. If wthe literal import of the text of an act is 
inconsistent with the legislative meaning or intent, or such 
interpretation leads to absurd results, the words in the statute 
will be modified to agree with the intention of the legislature." 
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Id. at §46.07. £££ £l£Q State v. Hunt. 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995) 
(holding that interpretation that renders statute inoperative 
should be avoided); and Salt Lake Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 
P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995) (holding that plain language of the statute 
prevails unless it makes a statute inoperative). 
A comparison between Section 63-46b-ll(l) ana Section 63-
46b-3(2)(b)(i) and 63-46b-3(e)(ii) leads to conclusion that the 
Utah legislature did not intend to put a burden of verification 
of the actual receipt of the notices by the parties on the 
Commission. This could result in an unwarranted financial burden 
on the state taxpayers. 
II. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
BY ITS ORDERS, DENIED THE PETITIONER DUE PROCESS. 
OR ACTED UNCONSTITUTIONALLY, 
The Commission did not abuse its discretion when it entered 
its Order of Default, because it acted within its discretion. 
The designation of a proceeding as formal or informal, 
establishes a procedural umbrella under which the appeal will be 
found. This designation does not refer just to a given hearing, 
but the "track" that will be followed until the Commission rules. 
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Utah Admin. R. R861-1A-5.B.1(c) creates that designation. 
Paragraph (B)(2) references, "Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Excepting the proceedings which are specifically informal 
proceedings, all other adjudicative proceedings will be formal 
adjudicative proceedings." Because this proceeding was not 
specifically designated as informal, it became a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. As practiced in other agencies and 
courts, scheduling hearings are held prior to "trial" to focus 
and narrow issues and schedule discovery, briefs and evidence. 
This is the nature of a status conference. Counsel for either 
party may argue matters material to the proceeding, and often 
they are converted to evidentiary proffers or informal 
proceedings. It is for these reasons that the written default 
notice appears on such Notices. (R. 23-24.) 
The Petitioner argues that the Commission did not have an 
authority to enter a default judgment because it conducted a 
conference and not an adjudicative hearing. (Petitioner's Brief, 
at 14.) Petitioner also argues that the Commission dismissed the 
Petition in violation of Petitioner's due process rights and 
18 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously. (Petitioner's Brief, at 15-
20.) Petitioner cites only the UAPA provisions and fails to 
substantiate. 
A. A Status Conference Is Part Of A Formal 
Adjyflicfltcry Proceeding. 
According to Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-3.B, a prehearing 
conference could be conducted to clarify issues before the 
adjudication, simplify evidence and possibly reach a settlement. 
A Status Conference is such a proceeding. It is easily 
understood as a hearing. Moreover, the Notice contained the 
following language: 
[U]pon showing that personal appearance may be 
unreasonably burdensome, the hearing may be conducted 
by telephone conference call. 
(R. 15) (emphasis added). Since parties may present or proffer 
evidence and arguments at the noticed status conference, it fits 
within the Commission's definition of "Hearing" in Utah Admin. 
Code R861-1A-1.A.7. The Commission fully complied with the 
requirement of Section 63-46b-ll(l)(b) of the Utah Code that 
allows the Commission to enter a default judgment if a party 
failed to participate in formal adjudicative proceedings. This 
19 
code section is even referenced in the title to the 
administrative rule. Thus, this court should uphold the 
Commission's position as acting within its discretionary 
authority. 
B. The Commission Hes Not Denied Petitioner's Due 
Process Rights-
The Commission did not deny Petitioner's due process rights 
because Petitioner has been properly notified at the upcoming 
proceedings. Due process rights are denied when there is a state 
action that deprives "any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." Dirks v. Cornwell. 754 P.2d 946, 
949 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that when state recognizes the 
legal effect of party's contractual arrangements, there was no 
state action and no violation of due process). Also, the 
guidelines for evaluating the agency's actions from the due 
process standpoint are outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371, 375, 91 S.Ct. 780-87, 784-79 
(1971) (holding that due process of law prohibits a state from 
denying access to its courts to indigents who seek dissolution of 
their marriages but are unable to pay costs). The court decided 
20 
that participants in "judicial process must be given a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard." Id. at 377. 
Notice and opportunity to be heard are the cornerstone 
rights constituting due process. Id. 378. At the same time, 
the court decided that *[D]ue process does not . . . require that 
the defendant in every civil case actually have a hearing on the 
merits." Id. "A State, can, for example, enter a default 
judgment against a defendant who, after adequate notice, fails to 
make a timely appearance." Id. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
Mullane requirements of proper notification. Id. Such a 
determination of what constitutes a proper notifications should 
be made taking into consideration u*the nature of the case7." 
Ifli citing Mullane, at 313. See also Dusty's. Inc. v. Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 868, 870-72 (Utah 
1992) (holding that when a taxpayer's petition for judicial 
review was untimely filed, and the Commission gave Dusty's, Inc. 
an actual and construction notice, Dusty's Inc. was unjustified 
in it failure to file an appeal). Petitioner was properly 
notified of the upcoming hearing. See argument supra. 
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C The Dismissal of the Petition by the Commission 
was not Arbitrary. Capricious, in Bad Faith, or 
Unconstitutional, and These Allegations Lack Legal 
or Factual Basis. 
Petitioner has failed to marshal evidence that the 
Commission misused or exceeded its discretion. 
in TQlemn v. Salt Leke County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), the court held that abuse of discretion 
means that a "tribunal has 'misused' or 'exceeded' its 
discretion." The court decided that it would not disturb 
findings of the tribunal that "are traditionally left to the 
discretion of a tribunal" unless they are in some way 
"'unreasonable.'" Id^, citing Child v, Salt LfrKe City Civil Serv, 
Comm'n. 575 P.2d 195, 197 (Utah 1978). According to Utah Admin. 
Code R861-1A-5.G.l. and P., the Commission has a wide discretion 
in defaulting a party or accepting or rejecting Petitions for 
Reconsideration. Thus, this court should decide that the 
Commission has not abused its discretion and properly dismissed 
the Petition. 
Also, in its Brief, Petitioner's arguments are unsupported 
by the record. (Petitioner's Brief, at 17-18.) No testimony was 
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presented, by affidavit or otherwise, of actual failure of 
receipt of the Notice. Petitioner cites in its brief a former 
decision and an unrelated assessment that are not in the record 
nor relevant to the case at bar. (Petitioner's Brief, at 17.) 
Factual representations regarding the Auditing Division, and 
references to disposition of that case should be disregarded as 
lacking in foundation or appearance in the Record. Petitioner 
also makes such serious allegations as falsity of the alleged tax 
documents, that additional tax assessments were made "to harass 
ARCO," (Petitioner's Brief at 18) and alleges the bad faith of 
the Commission. (Petitioner's Brief, at 19.) On page 19, 
Petitioner goes into narrative about its own opinion regarding 
the actions of the Commission, coloring it with phrases such as 
"egregious act of bad faith" and discussing Petitioner's and 
ARCO's tax status. (Petitioner's Brief at 19-20.) These 
allegations are unsupported by the record and should be dismissed 
by this Court. 
This Court has also held that "in order to secure setting 
aside a default judgement, the party in default must show, first, 
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tan] excusable neglect, and, second, a meritorious defense." 
State of Utah v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983). £££ 
also, Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (allowing the 
court to overturn a lower court's judgment because of "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"). The court in 
Musselman found neither sufficient excuse, nor a meritorious 
defense that would allow to set aside a default judgment against 
the petitioner. Moreover, this court held that "the standard of 
excusable neglect remain[s] a strict one" when arises in 
jurisdictional context. Prowswood v. Mountain Fuel Supply. 676 
P.2d 925, 959 (Utah 1984) (holding that inadvertent mistake of 
counsel in failing to disclose docketing fee with notice of 
appeal was not an excusable neglect, and the appeal should be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). See also American Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Pierce. 28 Utah 2d 76, 498 P.2d 648 (Utah 
1972)(holding that when the record does not reveal any excusable 
neglect, it is an "irresponsible neglect"); Russel v. Martell. 
681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984) (holding that any neglect of a 
party's attorney "is attributable" to the party). 
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Petitioner neither argues that the Order of Default should 
be dismissed based on excusable neglect, mistake or inadvertence, 
nor could it prevail on this argument. First, Petitioner had no 
excuse when his counsel failed to appear at the status 
conference. -ee argument supra. The Commission sent the Notice 
to Petitioner's listed address and to Petitioner's counsel's 
address. {R. 7.) Moreover, Petitioner's counsel was put on 
notice that status conference was requested. (R. 23.) His 
failure to stay informed of his client's legal affairs does not 
constitute an "excusable neglect." Second, Petitioner failed to 
present a meritorious defense for overturning a default judgment. 
Thus, the court has no factual or legal grounds for setting aside 
the Commission's Order. Therefore, this Court should uphold the 
Commission's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Commission mailed the Notice to Petitioner's listed 
address and to its counsel's correct business address, it 
properly notified Petitioner of the upcoming hearing. The 
Commission was not obligated to verify an actual receipt of the 
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Notice. Such a burden on the Commission is unsupported by the 
legislative intent, statutory and common law and, thus, is 
unwarranted. Both the Order of Default and dismissal Order 
should be affirmed. 
As part of the formal adjudicatory proceeding, Petitioner 
was afforded its opportunity to a hearing after a sufficient 
notice. Thus, Petitioner's Due process rights were preserved. 
Since there is a lack of evidence to support any allegation of 
bad faith, arbitrariness or capriciousness, these arguments 
should be disregarded. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the Commission's Order 
of Default and the dismissal of the Petition for Reconsideration. 
Dated this ^  day of August, 1997. 
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CERTIFICATE OF JAILING 
I hereby certify that on ^ —*"T)ay of August, 1997, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Shawn D. Turner 
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4516 South 700 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
vdavis/gale.br 
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ADDENDA A 
RECEIVED 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
JAN 2 0 1993 
RECEIVED BY 
AUDITING DIVISION 
David P. Brown (0451) 
Shawn D. Turner (5813) 
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY 
660 South 200 East Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. (801) 532-6200 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
mtmrm 
U B
 JAN 10 1993 ^ 
APPEALS SECTION 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
In the Matter of: 
Arco Electric 
660 South 200 East 
Suite #301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION 
The Petitioner herewith requests an agency action before the Utah State Tax Commission, 
as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3). 
1. If this petition results from a letter or notice from the Commission, include 
the date of the letter or notice and the originating division or officer. 
December 22, 1992; Sales and Use Tax Division, James H. Rogers. 
2. Indicate the agency's file number or other reference number. 
Sales and Use Tax Account #G03708; G02500. 
3. Indicate the particular tax involved, the period of alleged liability, if 
appropriate, ant the amount of tax or the issue in dispute. 
G03708 Sales Tax 4/89 to 3/92, all sums assumed and/or owing. G02500 Sales 
Tax 4/89 to 3/92, all sums assessed and/or owing. 
re'JO--339 
Include a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief or 
action sought from the agency. 
G03708 the sales at issue are sales to exempt entities, and are therefore exempt 
from tax. As the identical issues raised in this matter are before the Utah 
Supreme Court in case #92-0182, taxpayer requests action on this matter he 
stayed pending resolution of that case. Mr. McNemar, of the Sales and Use Tax 
Division, indicated that such a stay was also the desire of his division. 
G02500 The increased taxes at issue here are for the sale and installation of fire 
alarm equipment etc. at the Pepcon facility in Cedar City. 
Pepcon informed Arco at the time of the purchase that the equipment was being 
purchased under a valid tax exemption number, and such number was provided. 
Later the number turned out to be invalid. 
Pepcon however, insists that the materials provided by Arco are personal property 
which became a part of Pepcon machinery, which machinery is exempt from sales 
tax pursuant to R865-19-855. As the sale was exempt pursuant to Rule, the tax 
and interest should be abated. 
Include a summary of arguments and authorities relied upon. 
G03708 please see taxpayers brief filed in the Utah Supreme Court Case 
#92-0182. 
G02500 see response to #4. 
Indicate legal authority, jurisdiction, and/or rule under which agency action 
is required. 
R861-04A-1. 
Include a statement of the relief or action sought from the agency. 
Determination that taxpayer is not responsible for tax and abatement of tax, 
interest, and penalties. 
Do you request an oral hearing? Yes /X/ No / /. 
If not, the Commission will make a determination based on the information 
presented herewith. 
UU3---040 
9. Indicate the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the 
Petition for Redetermination is being sent. 
Dee Clark 
Arco Electric 
597 West 9320 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Telephone No. (801) 532-6200 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of this Petition for Redetermination to the Utah State Tax 
Commission, Auditing Division, 160 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84134-2100, was 
hand delivered this /'f A* day of January, 1993. ^ r 
OU'Ji/041 
ADDENDA B 
RECEIVED 
JAN 1 6 1996 
_ APPEALS SECTION 
STATE TAX COMMMISSIO 
SHAWN D. TURNER (5813) 
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 263-2900 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ARCO ELECTRIC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION 
OF COUNSEL 
Appeals Nos. 93-0237 and 93-0337 
Account Nos. G03708 and G02500 
Tax Type: Sales and Use Tax 
Plaintiff's counsel of record, Shawn D. Turner, hereby gives 
notice to the Court and all parties in the above-captioned action 
of his change of address and firm affiliation. Effective December 
1, 1995, counsel for Plaintiff may be contacted at: 
Shawn D. Turner 
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
phone (801)263-2900 
fax (801) 263-2902. 
DATED this el day of January, 1996. 
LARSON, KIRKHAM & TURNER 
Shawn D. Turner 
di)0u328 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ± day of January, 1996, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Substitution of Counsel to the following: 
Gale Francis 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Tax and Business Regulation Division 
50 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Kim Thorne 
Director of Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
/-
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ADDENDA C 
Before the Utah State Tax Commission 
Arco Electric 
Auditing Division 
VS. 
Plaintiff(s), 
Defendant(s). 
CASE NUMBER 
9 3 - 0 2 3 7 
Status Conference 
Arco Electric 
660 South 200 East 
Suite 301 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Case Type: Audit 
Acct/Serial No-: MULTIPLE-2 
Tax Type: Sales Tax 
NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE 
NOTICE is hereby given that the above-entitled matter has been 
set for a Status Conference before Judge Gail S. Reich as 
follows: 
DATE: October 9, 1996 
TIME: 1:00 pm Mountain Time 
PLACE: Utah State Tax Commission 
210 North 1950 West, Room 1020 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134-6200 
Upon showing that personal appearance may be unreasonably 
burdensome, the hearing may be conducted by telephone conference 
call. Requests for such hearing should be made to the Appeals Unit 
at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing. To appear by telephone, 
a party is to telephone the Appeals Unit at (801) 297-2280, fifteen (15) 
minutes before the scheduled time of the hearing, and provide a telephone 
number where the party can be reached. The party is to remain near the 
telephone and to keep the line clear. 
Failure to appear by telephone or in person may result in an 
Order of Default being entered against the non-appearing party. 
****************************************** 
PLEASE NOTE: Neither the filing of this appeal nor any proceeding 
scheduled during the appeal process precludes further discussion or 
negotiation between the parties. The Tax Commission fully supports 
and encourages continued interaction between the parties to attempt 
to reach an agreement on the outstanding issues. Any stipulation 
0U0U023 
arrived at should be submitted for Commission approval. 
DATED this (P day of QMXjtt/T 1996 
Appeals Technician :ia
(801) 297-2280 
If you need an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilites Act, 
contact the Tax Commission at (801) 297-3811 (TDD 297-3819). Please 
allow three working days for a response. 
0(J0o024 
C E R T I F I C A T E O F M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
Arco E l e c t r i c 
VS. 
Auditing D iv i s i on 
93-0237 
Arco Electric 
Petitioner 
660 South 200 East 
Suite 301 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sandberg, Craig 
Respondent 
Director of Auditing 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84134 
Turner, Shawn D. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Larson, Kirkham & Turner 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
Francis, Gale K. 
Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84144 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
Date ' Appears Staff 
UU0i>025 
ADDENDA D 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ARCO ELECTRIC, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
: ORDER OF DEFAULT 
v. ) 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) Appeal No. 93-0237 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : 
) Serial No. MULTIPLE-2 
Respondent. ) Tax Type: Sales 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Status 
Conference on October 9, 1996. Gail S. Reich, Administrative Law 
Judge, heard the matter for and on behalf of the Tax Commission. 
Present and representing Respondent was Gale Francis, Assistant 
Attorney General. 
Although duly notified of the time, date and place of the Status 
Conference, Petitioner failed to appear. 
After noting the default of Petitioner, the Tax Commission hereby 
enters its ORDER OF DEFAULT against Petitioner and dismisses the 
appeal. 
U00l*020 
DATED this ^ >H day of ^ S ^ ^ H l Y ^ , 1996 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
W. Val Oveson 
Chairman 
B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
3"/ Y ^ \\ Commissioner 
y ^ 0 < v C \ Richard B. McKe&wn 
Alice Shearer 
Commissioner 
4AW 
NOTICE: You have twenty (2 0) days after the date of a final order to 
file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you do not 
file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you have thirty 
(30) days after the date of a final order to file a.) a Petition for 
Judicial Review in the Supreme Court, or b.) a Petition for Judicial 
Review by trial de novo in the District Court. (Utah Administrative 
Rule R861-1A-5 (P) and Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601(1), 63-46b-13 et. seq.) 
GSFVLROW93-0237 DEF 
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C E R T I F I C A T E O F M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
Arco E l e c t r i c 
VS. 
Auditing D iv i s i on 
93-0237 
Arco Electric 
Petitioner 
660 South 200 East 
Suite 301 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sandbergf Craig 
.Respondent 
Director of Auditing 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84134 
Turner, Shawn D. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Larson, Kirkham & Turner 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
Francis, Gale K. 
Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84144 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
Date Appeals Staff <U 
ADDENDA E 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ARCO ELECTRIC, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Appeal No. 93-0237 
and 93-0337 
Account No. G03708 
Tax Type: Sales & Use 
STATEMENT QF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a 
Petition for Reconsideration, dated December 10, 1996, filed by 
Petitioner as a result of the Commissions final decision dated 
January 4, 1996 for Appeal No. 93-0337 and final decision dated 
November 27, 1996 for Appeal No. 93-0237. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P) provides that a 
Petition for Reconsideration "will allege as grounds for 
reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery 
of new evidence." Under this rule, the Tax Commission may 
exercise its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for 
Reconsideration. 
UOOi/004 
Appeal No. 93-0237 and 93-0337 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The Petition for Reconsideration on Appeal No. 93-0337 was 
not filed within the requisite period and therefore is denied on 
the grounds of untimeliness. As for the Petition for 
Reconsideration concerning Appeal No. 93-0237, Petitioner raises 
the issue of notice of the Status Conference which lead to the 
dismissal. Petitioner points out that notice was not sent to the 
Petitioner. However, the Petitioner acknowledges that the notice 
was properly sent to the correct address of Petitioner's attorney 
of record in this matter. Therefore, Based upon the foregoing, 
it is the decision and order of the Utah State Tax Commission 
that the Petition for 
UU0u0l)5 
Appeal No. 93-0237 and 93-0337 
Reconsideration be denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this ? day of KApfrTV\ 1997. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of a final 
order to file a.) a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme 
Court, or b.) a Petition for Judicial Review by trial de novo in 
District Court. (Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah 
Code Ann. §§59-1-601(1), 63-46b-13 et. seq.) 
GSfVssw/93-0237 ord 
OOObOOG 
C E R T I F I C A T E O P M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
Arco E l e c t r i c 
VS. 
Auditing D i v i s i o n 
93-0337 
Arco Electric 
Petitioner 
660 South 200 East, Ste. 301 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Turner, Shawn D. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Larson, Kirkham & Turner 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City UT 84107 
Sandberg, Craig 
Respondent 
Director of Auditing 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84134 
Francis, Gale K. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84144 
Clark, Dee 
.Representative for Petitioner 
597 West 2900 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
^ V v n \UirvU, A . Qfcctnn 
Date Appeals Staff 
OUOi/007 
ADDENDA F 
63-46b-ll STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
sion order confirming and adopting an Admin- Krantz v. Department of Commerce, 856 P.2d 
istrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
was faulty when it failed to contain a notice to __,. _ . _____ _ _ . . , _, 
petitioner of the right to apply for reconsider- Cltf* i n "S£ ° ^ V . ^ T ^ C ° m m n' 
ation conferred by former § 61-2-12(l)(b). 7 8 1 P-2 d 8 8 3 ( U t a h Ci' A^ 1989)" 
63-46b-ll. Default. 
1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if: 
(a) a party in aiiinfarmal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in 
the adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or partici-
pate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a re-
sponse under Sectipn 63-46h-6. 
(2)'" An order of defeult shall include a statement of the grounds for default 
and shall be mailed to all parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default 
order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to 
the default order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be 
made to the presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 63-46b-12, 
or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the 
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudi-
cative proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of 
default, conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adju-
dicative proceeding without the participation of the party in default and 
shall determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those 
affecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the 
agency and the party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-ll, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 267; 1988, ch. 72, § 21. 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior 
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity desig-
nated for that purpose by the statute or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party. 
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COPE »w Administration R861-1-5A 
-for.agency action, the demal will be communicated 
to the petitioner in writing at the petitioner's last 
known address Any such denial shall be an appea 
tabic order The Commission may deoy the petition 
if 
11 it is not filed in a timely manner, 
12 the Commission is not the proper board or 
agency to consider the petition, 
13 the Commission cannot grant the relief 
sought, 
14 it is determined that the petitioner is not the 
party who would be directly or adversely affected by 
the Commission action or contemplated action 
complained of, or 
IF Notice of Hearing At least ten days prior to 
a hearing date the Commission will notify the peti 
tiomng party by ordinary mail at its last known 
address of date, time, and place of any hearing 
R86M-5A Adjudication Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann Sections 59-1-205, 59-1-210, 59-2-
701, 63^l6b-4, 63-46b- 7, 63-46b-*,63-
46b-9, 63~46b-10, and 63-46b-ll 
1A How Instituted Adjudicative Proceedings 
may be initiated as provided in Rule R861 I-4A 
by a party directly or adversely affected by an 
action or a contemplated action of the Commission, 
or any of its divisions as provided by law 
IB Types Adjudicative proceedings will be of 
two types, informal and formal 
11 Informal adjudicative proceedings The foil 
owing shall be in formal adjudicative proceedings 
1(a) appeals requesting the waiver of penalty and 
interest where the amount in controversy is $250 00 
or less, 
1(b) all proceedings to revoke, suspend, or refuse 
to renew any license or permit related to motor 
vehicles, and 
1(c) any hearing designated as an informal proc-
eeding by the Commission 
fl(p- Formal adjudicative proceedings Excepting ^  
/the ""proceedings which are specifically informal 
(proceedings, all other adjudicative proceedings will 
'^ >e formal adjudicative proceedings ) 
\C Nonadjudicative Proceedings Applications 
for issuance, renewal, or exemption of licenses or 
permits, including but not limited to sales tax hoc 
nses, cigarette licenses, motor fuel and special fuel 
licenses and all licenses and registrations related to 
motor vehicles, airplanes, and recreational vehicles 
where the application is granted if there is statutory 
compliance, shall be granted if the application 
compbes with those statutory requirements The 
granting of any application, or a determination that 
the application fails to comply, or to continue to 
comply with those statutory requirements shall not 
be deemed to commence an adjudicative proceeding, 
but any person aggrieved by any such determination 
may file a request for agency action for a review of 
such determination 
ID Conversion The presiding officer may, on his 
own motion or on the motion of any party, convert 
a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal 
adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative 
proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if 
such conversion is in the interest of the parties and 
does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party 
Notice shall be given to all parties prior to any such 
conversion 
IE Quorum Except as otherwise provided by 
law, all formal adjudicative proceedings will be 
decided by a quorum of the commissioners Ajiy 
C O D E » C O
 w 
Provo Vlak U t a h 
commissioner who was either present at a hearing or 
who has familiarized himself with the record and 
with the arguments made in behalf of each position 
may participate in the decision of any adjudicative 
proceeding If three or more commissioners agree on 
a decision, that shall be the decision of the Comm 
ission If one or more commissioners abstain from 
participating in the decision, then the decision of the 
majority of those not abstaining will be a Commis 
sion decision If the Commission vote results in a tie 
vote on any matter, the position of the petitioning 
taxpayer will be deemed to have prevailed, and the 
Commission will publish the decision Orders on 
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be signed by 
three or more commissioners 
IF Rulings on Informal Adjudicative Proceed 
ings Decisions on informal adjudicative proceedings 
shall be signed by one or more commissioners 
1G Default 
11 Hie presiding officer may enter an order of 
default against a party if 
1(a) a party in an informal adjudicative procee-
ding fails to participate m the adjudicative procee-
dings, 
1(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding 
fails to attend or participate in a hearing, or 
1(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proce 
eding fails to file a response within the time speci 
fied Default, however, shall not be entered against 
the Commission or any division without a prior 
hearing on whether a default should be entered 
12 The order shall include a statement of the 
grounds for default and shall be mailed to all 
parties 
13 A defaulted party may seek to have the 
Commission set aside the default order according to 
procedures set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
14 After issuing the order of default, the presi 
ding officer shall either dismiss the appeal or 
conduct any further proceedings necessary to com 
plete the adjudicative proceeding without the parti 
cipation of the parr> in default and shall determine 
all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including 
those affecting the defaulting party 
1H Continuances Continuances may be granted 
at the discretion of the presiding officer Any 
request for continuance must be made in writing at 
least five days pnor to the scheduled hearing Con 
tinuances will be granted if fairness and justice to all 
parties demand such continuance Granted contin 
uances will be for a reasonable time, and at least 
five days advance written notice shall be given to all 
parties of the continued proceeding date unless all 
parties agree by stipulation to a sooner continued 
proceeding date 
1J Consobdatjon The prcsjdmg officer may 
allow consolidation of matters when the same tax 
assessment or series of assessments are involved in 
each, or where the fact situations and the legal 
questions presented are virtually identical The pre 
siding officer, however, will not force such consol 
idation, and each party will be entitled to a separate 
hearing if so desired unless this would involve such 
a number of hearings on a single fact situation or 
point of law that expeditious tax administration and 
the public interest would not be served The presi 
ding officer has wide discretion in allowing or ref 
using to allow consolidation, and will exercise disc-
retion in the interests of justice and fairness to citi 
zens of the state No consolidation of matters shall 
be required when such consolidation would have the 
tCode 303 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 4 
(Utah 1988) Phillips \ Smith 768 P 2d 449 
(Utah 1989), Rimensburger v Rimensburger, 
196 Utah Adv Rep 22 (Ct App 1992) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur 2d — 20 Am Jur 2d Courts vuthin state for purposes of state closed door 
§ 143, 61A Am Ju r 2d Pleading ^ 350 to statute barring unqualified or unregistered 
352, 62B Am Ju r 2d Process ^ 8, 9 foreign corporation from local courts — modern 
C.J.S — 21 C J S Courts § 54 et seq 71
 c a s e s 88 A L R 4th 466 
C J S Pleading ^ 408 to 412, 72 C J S Pro Ke\ N u m b e r s — Courts <^> 21 et seq 
c e s s
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 Pleading <s= 331 Process e= 4 to 6 
A.L.R. — What constitutes doing business 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney Separate summonses ma\ be signed and 
served 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)( 1), the sum-
mons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of 
time for good cause shown If the summons and complaint are not timely 
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative In any action brought against two or 
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within 
the 120 days or such longer period as ma> be allowed b> the court, the other or 
others may be served or appear at am time prior to trial 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the 
court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the action and the 
county in which it is brought It shall be directed to the defendant state the 
name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attornev if an \ , and 
otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number 1^  shall state the time 
within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, 
and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so judgment b> 
default will be rendered against the defendant It shall state either that the 
complaint is on file writh the court or that the complaint will be filed with the 
court within ten days of service If service is made by publication, the sum-
mons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of mone\ or other 
relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint max be served in this 
state or any other state or territory of the United States, b> the sheriff or 
constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the 
marshal 's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of 
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorne> 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), 
(3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and or the complaint 
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons 
and/or the complaint to a n ^ g e n t authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process; 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy 
to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none 
can be found within the state, then to any person having the care and 
control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service 
the infant is employed, 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or 
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person 
and to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed and in 
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the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, 
custody or control of the person; 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated 
by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the 
person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be served, 
or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the indi-
vidual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, 
promptly deliver the process to the individual served; 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a man-
aging or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by 
law to receive service of process andV it the agent is one authorized by 
statute to receive service and the statute so requires, bj_alsq mailing a. 
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within the 
state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, 
an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does busi-
ness within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of 
such office or place of business; 
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy thereof to 
the recorder; 
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the county clerk of such 
county; 
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy to 
the superintendent or business administrator of the board; 
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the 
president or secretary of its board; 
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to 
be brought against the state, by delivering a copy to the attorney general 
and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and 
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any 
public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy to 
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secre-
tary. 
(f) Service and proof of service in a foreign country. Service in a for-
eign country shall be made as follows: 
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for 
service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or 
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; and upon a corporation, 
partnership or association, by delivering a copy to an officer or a manag-
ing general agent; provided that such service be made by a person who is 
not a party to the action, not a party's attorney, and is not less than 18 
years of age, or who is designated by order of the court or by the foreign 
court; or 
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and 
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served as ordered by 
the court. Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed 
in these rules for service within this state, or by the law of the foreign 
country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to sub-
part (3) of this subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed 
by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfac-
tory to the court. 
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be 
served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, 
where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the 
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that the person to 
be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process 
may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service 
15 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 5 
by amendment, to be served any time before 
trial, otherwise, the plaintiff in an action 
would be virtually foreclosed from adding addi-
tional defendants after three months Valley 
Asphalt, Inc v Eldon J Stubbs Constr , Inc , 
714 P2d 1142 (Utah 1986) 
—Untimehness . 
Where a summons was dated 38 days later 
than a complaint was filed, but was not placed 
in the hands of a qualified person for service 
until seven months after the complaint was 
filed the summons was not timely issued 
Fibreboard Paper Prods Corp v Dietrich, 25 
Utah 2d 65, 475 P 2d 1005 (1970) 
Amended compla in t . 
In wrongful death action filed November 15, 
1973 with no summons issued, filing of 
amended complaint on November 8, 1974 did 
not recommence action, but amended com-
plaint related back to time of original one bv 
virtue of Rule 15(c), therefore, since summon^ 
did not issue within three months of filing of 
complaint, action was dismissed Cook v 
Starkey, 548 P 2d 1268 (Utah 1976) 
Waiver. 
If a party appears in court, counterclaims, 
and is partially successful, the party may not 
claim untimely service under Subdivision (b) 
Sorensen v Sorensen, 18 Utah 2d 102, 417 
P.2d 118 (1966) 
Cited in State ex rel Utah State Dep't of 
Social Servs v Santiago, 590 P 2d 335 (Utah 
1979), Wood v Weenig, 736 P 2d 1053 (Utah 
1987), Van Tassell v ShafTer, 742 P 2d 111 
(Utah Ct App 1987), Schultz v Conger, 755 
P.2d 165 (Utah 1988) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Graham v Sawaya 
Utah s Notice Requirements for In Personam 
Actions, 1982 Utah L Rev 657 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1988 
Utah L Rev 153 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L 
Rev 166 
B n g h a m Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgement in Utah Gra-
ham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am J u r 2d Corporations 
$ 2192 et seq , 56 Am J u r 2d Municipal Cor-
porations, Counties and Other Political Subdi-
visions, § 854 62B Am J u r 2d Process § 1 et 
seq , 68 Am Jur 2d Schools § 21, 72 Am J u r 
2d States, Territories, and Dependencies 
§ 126 
C.J.S. — 19 C J S Corporations § 1305 et 
seq 20 C J S Counties § 263, 64 C J S Mu-
nicipal Corporations § 2205, 72 C J S Process 
§ 26 et seq , 79 C.J S Schools and School Dis-
tricts § 436, 81 C J S States § 226 
A.L.R. — Mistake or error in middle initial 
or middle name of party as vitiating or invali-
dating civil process, summons, or the like, 6 
A L R 3 d 1179 
Attorney representing foreign corporation in 
litigation as its agent for service of process in 
unconnected actions or proceedings, 9 A L R 3d 
738 
Civil liability of one making false or fraudu-
lent return of process, 31 A L R 3d 1393 
Construction of phrase "usual place of 
abode," or similar terms referring to abode, 
residence, or domicil, as used in statutes relat 
ing to service of process, 32 A L R 3d 112 
Airplane or other aircraft as "motor vehicle" 
or the like within statute providing for con-
structive or substituted service of process on 
nonresident motorist, 36 A L R 3d 1387 
Sunday or holiday, validity of service of sum-
mons or complaint on, 63 A L R 3d 423 
In personam jurisdiction under long-arm 
statute of nonresident banking institution, 9 
A L R 4 t h 661 
In personam or territorial jurisdiction of 
state court in connection with obscenity prose-
cution of author, actor, photographer, pub-
lisher, distributor, or other party whose acts 
were performed outside the state, 16 A L R 4th 
1318 
Forum state's jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendant in action based on obscene or threat-
ening telephone call from out of state, 37 
A L R 4th 852 
Necessity and permissibility of raising claim 
for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in 
same proceeding in which abuse occurred — 
state cases, 82 A L R 4th 1115 
Key Numbers. — Corporations *= 507, 
Counties *=> 219, Municipal Corporations «= 
1029, Process «» 21, 23, 24, 50 to 58, 63, 64, 82, 
84 to 111, 127 to 153, 161 to 165, Schools and 
School Districts «=> 119, States *=> 204 
iRule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to 
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, 
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be 
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule 
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
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for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner pro-
vided for service of summons in Rule 4 
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attach-
ment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named 
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, 
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or posses-
sion of the property at the time of its seizure 
(b) Service: How made. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be 
jnade upon ajjartv xepresented by an attorney thejservice shall be made 
jipon the attorney unless service upon thejparty himself is orderecTby the 
court Service uporfthe attorney or upon a party shall be made by deliver-
ing a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no 
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court Delivery of a 
icopy within this rule means Handing it to the attorney or to the party, or 
leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof, or, 
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein, or, if 
the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing 
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers may be 
served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney 
practicing in any of the courts of this state 
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there are un-
usually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own 
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and re-
plies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-
claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other 
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the 
plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties A copy of every such order 
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a 
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party or on its own 
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, re-
quests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on 
order of the court or for use in the proceeding 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers 
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with 
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the papers to be filed 
with him, in which event he shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith 
transmit them to the office of the clerk, if any 
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1985, Jan 1, 1987 ) 
Advisory Committee Note — Rule 5(d) is 
amended to give the trial court the option, ei-
ther on an ad hoc basis or by local rule, of or-
dering that discovery papers, depositions, writ-
ten interrogatories, document requests, re-
quests for admission, and answers and re-
sponses need not be filed unless required for 
specific use in the case The committee is of the 
view that a local rule of the district courts on 
the subject should be encouraged 
Compiler's Notes — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 5, F R C P 
Cross-References — How civil action com-
menced U R C P 3(a) 
Service by mail, additional time after, 
U R C P 6(e) 
Third party practice, U R C P 14 
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Cited in National Farmers Union Property 
& Cas Co v Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P 2d 
249 (1955), Holmes v Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 
326 P2d 722 (1958), Howard v Howard, 11 
Utah 2d 149, 356 P 2d 275 (1960), Nunle> v 
Stan Katz Real Estate, lnc , 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P 2d 798 (1964), Hanson v General Bldrs 
Supph Co , 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P 2d 61 
(1964), James Mfg Co v Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P2d 127 (1964), Porcupine Reservoir 
Co v Lloyd W Keller Corp , 15 Utah 2d 318, 
392 P 2 d 620 (1964), Watson v Anderson, 29 
Utah 2d 36, 504 P 2d 1003 (1973), Nichols v 
State, 554 P 2d 231 (Utah 1976), Edgar v 
Wagner 572 P 2d 405 (Utah 1977), Time Com 
Fin Corp v Bnmhall , 575 P 2d 701 (Utah 
1978), Anderton v Montgomery, 607 P 2d 828 
(Utah 1980), Miller Pontiac, lnc v Osborne, 
622 P 2d 800 (Utah 1981), Mulhenn v Inger-
soll-Rand Co, 628 P 2d 1301 (Utah 1981), 
Kohler v Garden City, 639 P 2d 162 (Utah 
1981), Pozzolan Portland Cement Co v Gard-
ner, 668 P2d 569 (Utah 1983), Nelson v 
Jacobsen, 669 P 2d 1207 (Utah 1983), Golden 
Key Realty, lnc v Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1985), Estate of Kay. 705 P 2d 1165 (Utah 
1985), York v Unqualified Washington 
County Elected Officials, 714 P 2d 679 (Utah 
1986), King v Fereday, 739 P 2d 618 (Utah 
1987), Fackrell v Fackrell. 740 P 2d 1318 
(Utah 1987). Walker v Carlson, 740 P 2d 1372 
(Utah Ct App 1987), Arnica Mut Ins Co v 
Schettler, 768 P 2d 950 (Utah Ct App 1989), 
Paryzek v Paryzek, 776 P 2d 78 (Utah Ct' 
App 1989), Allred v Alired, 835 P 2d 974 
(Utah Ct App 1992) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5S A ^ j d f 2d New Trial 
^ 11 to 14. 29 et seq , 187 to 191 
C.J.S. — 66 C J S New Trial §§ 13 et seq , 
115, 116. 122 to 127 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed bv 
statute or rules of court, 3 A L R 3d 1191 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments bv judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case, 6 A L R 3d 1457 
Necessitv and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A L R 3d 1000 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A L R 3d 335 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which the> are written, 10 A L R 3d 501 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A L R 3d 918 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A L R 3 d 1101 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A L R 3d 637 
Juror 's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner ^ associate of such attor-
ney, as ground lor new trial or mistrial, 64 
A L R 3 d 126 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for nev, trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A L R 3d 845 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded bv parties, 9 A L R 4th 1041 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal. 38 A L R 4th 1170 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A L R 4th 747 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A L R 4th 1049 
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
man in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases, 96 A L R Fed 541 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
der Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
§§ 51 et seq ) — modern cases, 97 A L R Fed 
189 
Key Numbers. — Nsw Trial «= 13 et seq , 
110, 116 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
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,4, when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
<*r\ed upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action, (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
ba^ ed has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application, or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made 
vwthin a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more thanJ} 
.nonthsjifter the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter 
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action 
Compiler's Notes — This rule is similar to Cross-References — Fee for filine motion 
Rule 60 F R C P to set aside judgment ?^ 21 1 5 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Am other reason justifying re l ie f 
—Default judgment 
—Impossibiht> of compliance with order 
—Incompetent counsel 
—Lack of due process 
— Merits of case 
—Mi>take or inadvertence 
—Real part> in interest 
Appeals 
Clerical mistakes 
—Computation of damages 
—Correction after appeal 
—Date of judgment 
\ oid judgment 
—Estate record 
—Inherent power of courts 
—Intent of court and parties 
—Judicial error distinguished 
—Order prepared by counsel 
—Predating of new trial motion 
Court s discretion 
Default judgment 
Effect of set-aside judgment 
—Admissions 
Fraud 
—Divorce action 
Form of motion 
Independent action 
—Constitutionality of taxes 
—Divorce decree 
—Fraud or duress 
—Motion distinguished 
Invalid summons 
—Amendment without notice 
Inequity of prospective application 
Jurisdiction 
Mistake inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect 
—Default judgment 
Illness 
Inconvenience 
Merits of claim 
Negligence of attorney 
No claim for relief 
—Delayed motion for new trial 
—Failure to file cost bill 
—Failure to File notice of appeal 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings 
—Trial court s discretion 
—Unemplo\ment compensation appeal 
—Workmen s compensation appeal 
Newlv discovered evidence 
—Burden of proof 
—Discretion not abused 
Procedure 
—Notice to parties 
Res judicata 
Reversal of judgment 
—Invalidation of sale 
Satisfaction release or discharge 
—Accord and satisfaction 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand 
—Erroneously included damages 
—Prospective application of judgment 
Timeliness of motion 
—Confused mental condition of partv 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution 
—Fraud 
—Invalid service 
—Judicial error 
—Jurisdiction 
—Mistake inadvertence and neglect 
—Newly discovered evidence 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption 
—"Reasonable time ' 
—Reconsideration of previouslv denied motion 
—Satisfaction 
Unauthorized appearance 
Void judgment 
—Basis 
—Lack of jurisdiction 
Cited 
"Any o the r r eason justifying relief/' 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6), sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief and third 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time Laub v South Cent Utah Tel Ass'n, 657 
P 2 d 1304 (Utah 1982), Richins v Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P 2d 382 (Utah Ct App 
1991) 
